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COMMENTS
TUG OF WAR: THE SUPREME COURT,
CONGRESS, AND THE CIRCUITS-
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S INPUT ON THE
STRUGGLE TO DEFINE A PRISONER'S
RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN
ADKINS V. KASPAR
SCOTT BUDZENSKIt
INTRODUCTION
Religious freedom is arguably the most important
fundamental right guaranteed to the American people by the
framers of the United States Constitution.1 Freedom from and
freedom of religion were so important to our founding fathers
that they warranted inclusion in the first two clauses of the Bill
of Rights.2 When national legislation implicates these basic
rights, it is of the utmost importance to determine the precise
f J.D. Candidate, June 2007, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 2003,
State University of New York at Albany.
I See U.S. CONST. amend. I, cls. 1-2. "We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313
(1952). "There is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three
branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789."
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984). See Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 (1947), for Justice Black's account of the history that formed the framers'
intent to, "[i]n the words of Jefferson .... erect 'a wall of separation between church
and State."' Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
2 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. Justice
Jackson explained that:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One's right to... freedom of worship and assembly,
and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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scope of the law's impact. 3  These basic rights are clearly
guaranteed, not only to every member of our free society, but to
incarcerated criminals as well.4 Although incarcerated criminals
experience some limitation of rights, they are still United States
citizens and are thus protected by the Constitution.5 Congress
has recognized this irrefutable fact and has sought to ensure
protection of prisoners' religious rights in the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA").6 The
RLUIPA declares that "[n]o government shall impose a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing
in or confined to an institution."7 Because Congress opted not to
define what government conduct would qualify as a "substantial
burden," this attempt to protect prisoners' religious rights was
left largely to judicial interpretation.8 Circuit courts across the
3 This is evidenced by the heightened standard of review used by the Supreme
Court to assess the constitutionality of a statute affecting a fundamental right.
"[Fundamental rights] require particularly careful scrutiny of the [government]
needs asserted to justify their abridgment." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
790 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1960)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). Moreover, when legislation specifically affects a
constitutionally enumerated right, "[t]here may be [a] narrower scope for operation
of the presumption of constitutionality .... " United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). "[T]he review of statutes directed at particular
religious... minorities" has required the Court to employ a "more searching judicial
inquiry." Id. at 153 n.4.
4 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). "Prison walls do not form a
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the
Constitution .... Because prisoners retain these rights, 'when a prison regulation or
practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will
discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.'" Id. (quoting Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974)).
5 "[C]onvicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of
their conviction and confinement in prison." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545
(1979); see also Lindy K. Lucero & Jeffery P. Bernhardt, Thirty-First Annual Review
of Criminal Procedure: VI. Prisoners' Rights, 90 GEO. L.J. 2005, 2010-16 (2002)
(outlining the impact incarceration has on prisoners' First Amendment rights).
6 42 U.S.C §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000); see also 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (2000)
[hereinafter Legislative Hearings] (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
"Congress has long acted to protect the civil rights of institutionalized
persons .... Institutional residents' right to practice their faith is at the mercy of
those running the institution .... [P]rison officials sometimes impose frivolous or
arbitrary rules ... [and] some institutions restrict religious liberty in egregious and
unnecessary ways." Id.
7 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-1 (2000).
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 (2000) (excluding "substantial burden" from the list of
terms defined by the statute); see also Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 568 (5th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2549 (2005) ("The RLUIPA does not contain a
definition of 'substantial burden'....").
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country have disagreed as to what constitutes a "substantial
burden" within the meaning of the RLUIPA, but the United
States Supreme Court has declined to address the issue.9
Recently, in Adkins v. Kaspar,10 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit added its interpretation of "substantial burden"
under the RLUIPA to the already unworkable list of definitions
employed by courts across the country." In affirming the district
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs RLUIPA claim, the Fifth
Circuit held that "a government action or regulation does not rise
to the level of a substantial burden on religious exercise if it
merely prevents the adherent from either enjoying some benefit
that is not otherwise generally available or acting in a way that
is not otherwise generally allowed." 12 Because of the importance
of the fundamental right to religion, it is imperative that the
Supreme Court settle this dispute among the circuits and declare
a uniform standard for the lower courts to follow.' 3  The
plaintiffs petition for certiorari in Adkins gave the Court the
ability to speak on the issue and provide the circuits with much
needed guidance. 14 In denying certiorari, the Court not only
condemned one man's quest for religious freedom, but also left all
prisoners' religious rights in a precarious position.1 5
9 See Adkins, 393 F.3d at 568 ("[The courts that have assayed [the RLUIPA]
are not in agreement."). See generally Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-26
(2005) (addressing the constitutionality of the RLUIPA without establishing what
constitutes a "substantial burden" within the meaning of the Act).
10 393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2549 (2005).
11 Farrow v. Stanley, No. 02-567-PB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24374, at *11-13
(D.N.H. Oct. 20, 2005) (recognizing the disagreement among circuit courts and
listing some of the conflicting definitions for "substantial burden"); see also infra
Part II (surveying the various definitions of "substantial burden" adopted by the
circuit courts).
12 Adkins, 393 F.3d at 570; see infra Part JI.E (elaborating in more detail on the
Fifth Circuit's rationale and holding in the Adkins case).
13 "A principal purpose for which [the Supreme Court uses its] certiorari
jurisdiction.., is to resolve conflicts among the United States courts of
appeals... concerning the meaning of provisions of federal law." Braxton v. United
States, 500 U.S. 344, 347 (1991) (citing SUP CT. R. 10); Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 10, Adkins v. Kasper, 125 S. Ct. 2549 (2005) (No. 04-1347).
14 Because such an important right is at stake and because the RLUIPA has
been applied not only in two different ways-as might be the case in the ordinary
circuit split-but in several conflicting ways, there is an exceptional need for
Supreme Court clarification.
15 Adkins v. Kasper, 125 S. Ct. 2549 (2005). This unresolved circuit dispute
risks violation of all American prisoners' rights. The inconsistent application of the
RLUIPA creates confusion among prison officials as to exactly what conduct
amounts to an unconstitutional violation of prisoners' religious rights. Likewise,
2006] 1337
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The plaintiff in Adkins was a prisoner of the State of Texas,
incarcerated at the Coffield Prison, and a practicing member of
the Yahweh Evangelical Assembly ("YEA"). 16  Plaintiffs YEA
religion required that he observe certain days of rest and
worship, including each Saturday, for the Sabbath, as well as
other specified holy days. 17 According to the YEA faith, the
plaintiff and his fellow adherents were required to assemble and
worship together, in congregation, on each of those particular
days.18 Nevertheless, as an inmate at Coffield, the plaintiff was
prevented from adhering to these religious precepts due to the
requirements of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's
("TDCJ") religious accommodation policy. 19 Under the TDCJ
policy, religious assembly and congregation were not permitted
unless an accredited outside world religious volunteer was
present.20  Because a qualified YEA volunteer only visited
Coffield once a month, the plaintiff was denied the ability to
adhere to his religious requirements at least three times per
month. 21 It is important to point out, however, that Muslims at
Coffield were apparently exempt from the TDCJ policy; Muslims
were regularly permitted to assemble in congregation without an
accredited outside world religious volunteer being present.22
Plaintiff brought suit in federal court claiming, among other
things, that his rights were violated under the RLUIPA.23 The
prisoners cannot be sure if they have truly been deprived of these basic rights.
Although some may not regret such violation because prisoners have transgressed
against society, "the federal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional
claims of prison inmates." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (emphasis added)
(citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)).
16 Adkins, 393 F.3d at 562.
17 See id.
18 See id. The requirements of the faith were established by the testimony of a
YEA elder at an evidentiary hearing before a magistrate judge. See id.
19 See id. at 562-63. The TDCJ, the state agency controlling Coffield Prison, was
included as one of the named defendants in Adkins, among several others. See id. at
562.
20 See id. at 566.
21 During those months that included YEA holy days, the plaintiff was denied
the ability to follow his religious requirements more than three times. For a listing
of the annual holy days, as well as other fundamental requirements of the YEA
faith, see Fundamentals of Faith of Yahweh's Evangelical Assembly, http://members.
cox.net/thomasahobbs/yea-8.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).
22 See Adkins, 393 F.3d at 566 (noting that Muslims were exempt from the
policy due to a separate court order).
23 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000). In the district court, plaintiff also
alleged violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but likewise failed
1338 [Vol. 80:1335
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matter was referred to a magistrate judge who recommended
dismissal after conducting an evidentiary hearing. 24 The district
court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and
dismissed the plaintiffs case. 25 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, 26 and the
Supreme Court subsequently denied the plaintiffs petition for a
writ of certiorari.27
On appeal, plaintiff renewed his RLUIPA claim contending
that his rights under the Act were violated. 28 Plaintiff argued
that the defendants imposed a substantial burden on his
religious exercise without demonstrating that the burden was the
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest.29
In rejecting his RLUIPA claim, the Fifth Circuit began its
analysis by explaining that the plaintiff must first demonstrate
that the government imposed a "substantial burden" on his
"religious exercise." 30  To determine whether the plaintiff met
this requirement, the court explained that it would make two
inquiries:31 (1) whether the burdened activity qualifies as
"religious exercise"; and (2) whether this burden is
"substantial. ' 32 Pointing out that the RLUIPA defines "religious
exercise" as "any exercise of religion," the court found that "[tihe
activities alleged to be burdened in this case-YEA Sabbath and
holy day gatherings-easily qualify as 'religious exercise' under
the RLUIPA[] . . .,33
Moving to its second inquiry, the court noted that defining
"[w]hat constitutes a 'substantial burden' under the RLUIPA is a
question of first impression in [the Fifth Circuit] ."34
Furthermore, the court pointed out that the RLUIPA left this
on those claims. Adkins, 393 F.3d at 562.
24 Adkins, 393 F.3d at 562.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 572.
27 Adkins v. Kasper, 125 S. Ct. 2549 (2005).
28 Adkins, 393 F.3d at 562. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, plaintiff also argued
that his First Amendment right to free exercise was violated, that his right to equal
protection was violated, and that the magistrate judge committed an abuse of
discretion in denying witness subpoena requests. Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 567.
31 Id. It seems that other circuit courts have approached the application of the
RLUIPA in much the same way. See infra text accompanying notes 85-103.
32 Adkins, 393 F.3d at 567.
33 Id. at 567-68.
34 Id. at 568.
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term undefined and that other circuits that have interpreted the
language are in disagreement. 35 After surveying the plain
meaning of the text, the other circuits' definitions, and Supreme
Court jurisprudence in other contexts, the court enunciated a
new standard for application of the RLUIPA in the Fifth
Circuit. 36 The court held that "a government action or regulation
creates a 'substantial burden' on a religious exercise if it truly
pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious
behavior and significantly violate his religious beliefs."37
According to the Fifth Circuit, however, there was an exception:
"[A] government action or regulation does not rise to the level of
a substantial burden on religious exercise if it merely prevents
the adherent from either enjoying some benefit that is not
otherwise generally available or acting in a way that is not
otherwise generally allowed."38
The court applied its new RLUIPA standard to the plaintiffs
case but gave only a brief rationale to support its conclusion. 39
The court held that "[t]he requirement of an outside volunteer-
which is a uniform requirement for all religious assemblies at
Coffield with the exception of Muslims-does not place a
substantial burden on Adkins's religious exercise."40  The court
found that the burden resulted from "a dearth of qualified
outside volunteers available to go to Coffield .. .not from some
rule or regulation that directly prohibits such gatherings."41
Although it is not altogether clear from the opinion, it seems that
the plaintiffs case fell under the Fifth Circuit's exception-that
is, under the RLUIPA, a substantial burden does not exist if the
burden on the adherent's religious exercise is the result of a rule
that is generally applicable to all prisoners. 42  Therefore,
35 Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court has neither addressed this dispute among
the circuits nor established a definition of "substantial burden" in the context of the
RLUIPA. See Farrow v. Stanley, No. 02-567-PB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24374, at
*11 (D.N.H. Oct. 20, 2005).
36 See Adkins, 393 F.3d at 569-70.
37 Id. at 570.
38 Id.
39 See id. at 571. The court's application of the RLUIPA to the plaintiffs case
occupied less than one page; indeed, the court allocated a very small proportion of its
opinion to the application. See id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See id. at 570 ("[A] government action or regulation does not rise to the level
of a substantial burden on religious exercise if it merely prevents the adherent from
[Vol. 80:13351340
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according to the Fifth Circuit, because religious assembly at
Coffield was a benefit that was not generally allowed unless a
qualified outside volunteer was present, the burden resulting
from the TDCJ religious accommodation policy did not rise to the
level of a substantial burden under the RLUIPA. 43 Because the
Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate a
substantial burden under the RLUIPA, it affirmed the district
court's dismissal without proceeding through the final statutory
step44-determining whether imposition of the substantial
burden was in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest
through the least restrictive means.45
This Comment sets forth that the Fifth Circuit, along with
several other courts of appeals across the country, erred in
interpreting the RLUIPA. Part I gives a brief history of the
events leading to the enactment of the RLUIPA and outlines the
relevant terms of the statute. Part II charts the circuit dispute
that has developed under the RLUIPA. Part III identifies the
flaws in the various circuit court approaches and endeavors to
create a standard for "substantial burden" under the RLUIPA
that remains consistent with congressional intent. Part IV
applies what this Comment identifies as the correct standard
under the RLUIPA and argues that the Fifth Circuit should have
reversed the lower court in Adkins. Finally, this Comment
concludes by arguing that a Supreme Court standard is
necessary to put an end to the circuit dispute and to vindicate
prisoners' rights.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE RLUIPA
In order to gain a better understanding of the RLUIPA and
its proper application to the Adkins case, it will be helpful to
briefly outline the events leading to enactment. According to one
court, the "RLUIPA represents the latest act in an ongoing tug of
either enjoying some benefit that is not otherwise generally available or acting in a
way that is not otherwise generally allowed.").
43 The court never explicitly stated that the plaintiffs case fell under the
exception; however, it is reasonable to conclude that the court thought the exception
applied because of the emphasis it placed on the fact that the presence of an outside
volunteer was a "uniform requirement" that did not create a substantial burden
under the Act. See id. at 571.
44 See id.
45 See 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-1(a)(2) (2000).
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war between Congress and the Supreme Court. '4 6 This battle
between the two branches of government began in 1990 when the
Supreme Court decided Employment Division v. Smith.47 The
Smith Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment does not protect against government-imposed
substantial burdens on religion that result from rules of general
applicability.48 Before the Smith decision, the Court regularly
applied the test it developed in Sherbert v. Verner49 to all
government-imposed substantial burdens, whether or not they
resulted from a rule of general applicability. Under the Sherbert
test, any government action that substantially burdened
religious exercise could only be justified by a compelling
governmental interest.50 The Smith Court, however, changed
this inquiry and held that the Sherbert test should no longer be
used when a burden on religious exercise is the result of a
generally applicable rule.51 Essentially, the Smith Court lowered
the standard of scrutiny for the review of government intrusions
on religious exercise if they are derived from rules that are
equally applicable to all individuals.52
In direct response to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). 53 The Act explicitly
sought to supersede Smith; on its face, the Act stated:
[Gjovernments should not substantially burden religious
exercise without compelling justification; in [Smith] the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by
laws neutral toward religion .... The purposes of this Act are
to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
46 Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1088
(C.D. Cal. 2003); see also St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28072, at *28 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 11, 2005).
47 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
48 See id. at 878-79. "[Tlhe right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).'" Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
49 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
5o See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
51 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85. "Although... we have sometimes used the
Sherbert test to analyze free exercise challenges... [w]e conclude today that the
sounder approach ... is to hold the test inapplicable to such challenges." Id.
52 See id. at 888-90.
53 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000).
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[Sherbert] ... and to guarantee its application in all cases
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened .... 54
The RFRA, therefore, codified the Sherbert test, also known as
the compelling interest test.55 It applied to all government-
imposed substantial burdens on the exercise of religion "even if
the burden result[ed] from a rule of general applicability ....
The government could overcome the RFRA requirements only if
it could demonstrate that the resulting burden was "(1) in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest."57 While the RFRA effectively overruled
Smith, the Act would only survive until its constitutionality was
tested in the Supreme Court.
By 1997, a case questioning the validity of the RFRA made
its way to the Court. 58 In City of Boerne v. Flores,59 the Supreme
Court explained that by enacting the RFRA, Congress exceeded
its remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. 60 Thus,
the Court held that the RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to
the States.61 At the conclusion of its opinion, the Court sought to
send a message to Congress in response to this "tug of war" that
was developing.62 The Court wrote "[w]hen the political branches
of the Government act against the background of a judicial
54 Id. §§ 2000bb(a)(3)-(a)(4), (b)-(b)(1).
55 See id. § 2000bb(b)(1).
56 Id. § 2000bb-l(a).
57 Id. § 2000bb-l(b)-(b)(2).
58 The case arose after the defendant municipality denied a building permit
application for the erection of a church. Plaintiff Archbishop brought suit claiming,
inter alia, violation of the RFRA. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511
(1997). The municipality's defense included the argument that the RFRA was
unconstitutional. Id. at 512.
59 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
60 See id. at 519. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to
enforce the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause on the States, but only through
remedial or preventative measures. See id. The Court found that the RFRA,
however, was not remedial in nature, but was a legislative attempt to alter the
substance of the Free Exercise Clause, which it had no power to do. See id.
61 See id. at 536 ("[T]he provisions of the [RFRA] here invoked are beyond
congressional authority .... ). But see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 n.2
(2005) (collecting cases) (explaining that the Supreme Court has never ruled on the
RFRA's constitutionality as applied to the federal government, although some courts
of appeals have held it to be constitutional in that context).
62 Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1088-
89 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (referring to Congressional efforts to supersede the Supreme
Court and vice versa as a "tug of war").
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interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be
understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will
treat its precedents with the respect due them ... ,,63 By this
point, it appears that the "tug of war" between Congress and the
Court was fully underway but not over by any means.
Once again, Congress responded to the Supreme Court
ruling. In the three years following the Court's decision in City of
Boerne, Congress held hearings to evaluate how it could reinstate
the protection of religious liberty it hoped to achieve under the
RFRA with new legislation that would pass constitutional muster
with the Court. 64 The culmination of these hearings eventually
ended in 2000 with the enactment of the RLUIPA. 65  The
RLUIPA reinstated the same standard for protecting religious
liberty previously provided by the RFRA, but significantly
narrowed the scope of application; the RLUIPA applies only to
institutionalized persons 66 and land use regulations. 67 For the
purposes of this Comment, the focus will be on the protection the
RLUIPA supplies to institutionalized persons.
For the most part, within its scope of application, the
RLUIPA mirrors its RFRA predecessor. 68 The RLUIPA applies to
all government-imposed substantial burdens on an
institutionalized person's religious exercise "even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability .... "69 Consistent
with the RFRA, the RLUIPA also included a provision outlining
the Sherbert test: the government may overcome the Act's
requirements only if it can demonstrate that the burden
resulting "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
63 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
64 See, e.g., Legislative Hearings, supra note 6, at S7774. "The bill [targeting
burdens on religious liberty] is based on three years of hearings ... that addressed
in great detail both the need for legislation and the scope of Congressional power to
enact such legislation." Id.
65 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000).
66 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000) (providing for "[p]rotection of religious exercise of
institutionalized persons").
67 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000) (providing for "[p]rotection of land use as religious
exercise").
68 Legislative Hearings, supra note 6, at S7774. 'Within this scope of
application, the bill applies the standard of the [RFRA], 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1
(1994) .... Id.
69 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-l(a) (2000).
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interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest."70
Therefore, at least with regard to institutionalized persons,
the RLUIPA simply reinstated the protection afforded by the
RFRA. Further investigation into the RLUIPA, however, reveals
that it also made two significant advances. First, no doubt to
avoid the fate suffered by the RFRA in City of Boerne,71 Congress
clearly stated that it invoked its powers under the Spending
Clause72 and Commerce Clause 73 to enact the RLUIPA. Second,
Congress defined the term "religious exercise" to include "any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief."74 This definitional change was crucial
because under the RFRA, "exercise of religion" was originally
defined by importing the meaning of the term as used under the
First Amendment. 75 Supreme Court First Amendment Free
Exercise jurisprudence holds that the burdened activity must be
a "central tenet" of the adherent's religion, 76 while under the
RLUIPA definition, as noted, the burdened activity must only be
considered "any exercise of religion."77 Consequently, although
the RLUIPA's scope of application is narrower, the new statute
protects a much broader range of religious activity than did the
RFRA.
The years immediately following the enactment of the
RLUIPA were plagued with doubt as to the Act's
constitutionality.7 8 These doubts were echoed in debate among
70 Id. Compare 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) (2000), with 42 U.S.C § 2000bb-
1(b)(1)-(2) (2005).
71 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997) (finding the RFRA
unconstitutional because congress exceeded its enforcement powers).
72 See 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-1(b)(1) (2000) ("This section applies in any case in
which-(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives
Federal financial assistance ... ").
73 See 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-1(b)(2) (2000) ("This section applies in any case in
which-(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with
Indian tribes.").
74 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000).
75 See 42 U.S.C § 2000bb-2(4) (1993) (amended 2000) ('The term 'exercise of
religion' means the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the
Constitution.").
76 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm'r., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (explaining that
"[tlhe free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial
burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice") (emphasis added).
77 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000).
78 See Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 n.52 (2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
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commentators and courts. 79 It was not until 2005 when the
Supreme Court decided Cutter v. Wilkinson80 that it addressed
the question of the RLUIPA's constitutionality. The Cutter Court
held that the RLUIPA "qualifies as a permissible legislative
accommodation of religion that is not barred by the
Establishment Clause."81  The Court explained that there is in
fact "some space for legislative action neither compelled by the
Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment
Clause. '8 2 Although the Court found that the RLUIPA did not
violate the Constitution on those grounds, it did not undertake to
answer whether Congress exceeded its powers under the
Commerce Clause or the Spending Clause,8 3 as those questions
apparently were not properly before the Court.8 4 Thus, presently
it appears that the RLUIPA remains in full force and effect. The
Cutter Court, however, did not explain what constitutes a
"substantial burden" under the RLUIPA. Neither the RFRA nor
the RLUIPA defined the term and circuit court interpretations
vary. For that reason, the next section will explore the
disagreement that has emerged among the circuits over what
constitutes a "substantial burden" within the meaning of the
RLUIPA.
11. THE RLUIPA SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Outlining the approaches different circuits have taken in
assessing what constitutes a "substantial burden" under the
RLUIPA will help to highlight the Fifth Circuit's error in Adkins.
Furthermore, surveying the leading case from each circuit that
2549 (2005) (collecting cases) (recognizing that, after the RLUIPA was enacted, a
circuit split developed as to the Act's constitutionality).
79 Id.; see also, e.g., Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success
and Constitutionality of RLUIPA's Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY
501, 572-607 (2005) (surveying the debate among scholars and the judiciary over the
RLUIPA's constitutionality); Lawrence G. Sager, Panel One Commentary, 57 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9, 9-16 (2000) (outlining some of the constitutional predicable
questions that might arise under the RLUIPA).
80 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
81 Id. at 720.
82 Id. at 719.
83 See id. at 719 n.7.
84 See id. ("[Tihese defensive pleas were not addressed by the Court of Appeals,
and mindful that we are a court of review, not of first view, we do not consider them
here.").
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reviewed the issue will aid in determining the correct application
of the RLUIPA for future cases.
A. The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit uses the same definition of "substantial
burden" under the RLUIPA as it did under the RFRA. In
Murphy v. Missouri Department of Corrections,8 5 the court
explained that "the language of the [RLUIPA] is to be applied
just as it was under [the] RFRA. '8 6 In the Eighth Circuit, under
the RFRA and now also under the RLUIPA, a substantial burden
exists if the government action "significantly inhibit[s] or
constrain[s]" some conduct that is a "central tenet" of the person's
religion.8 7
B. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits used the same definition of
"substantial burden" under the RFRA;88  however, after
interpreting the RLUIPA in Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v.
City of Chicago,8 9 the Seventh Circuit declined to follow its
previous formulation of "substantial burden" under the RFRA
85 372 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff in Murphy, a member of the
Christian Separatist Church Society, was incarcerated at a prison facility operated
by the Missouri Department of Corrections. Id. at 981. The plaintiff claimed, among
other things, that prison officials violated his rights under the RLUIPA by denying
him group worship, discussion, and study. See id. at 988. On summary judgment,
the district court concluded that the plaintiffs religion was not substantially
burdened because group worship, discussion, and study could not be considered
central tenets of his religion. Id. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the district
court's conclusions were improper for summary judgment and remanded the case for
a trial to determine the merits of the plaintiffs allegations. See id.
86 Id. at 987.
87 Id. at 988 (quoting Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 1997)).
88 See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
substantial burden under the RFRA "is one that forces adherents of a religion to
refrain from religiously motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or
expression that manifests a central tenet of a person's religious beliefs, or compels
conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs") (emphasis added).
89 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003). The plaintiffs in Urban Believers were members
of an association of Chicago-area churches that brought suit contending that the
City of Chicago's zoning policies violated their rights under the RLUIPA. Id. at 756-
58. The district court denied the plaintiffs' claim and the Seventh Circuit affirmed,
finding it significant that the churches were ultimately able to locate themselves
within the city limits. See id. at 761. Furthermore, the court explained that the
considerable amount of time and money the churches were required to expend under
the zoning laws did not create a substantial burden under the RLUIPA. See id.
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and adopted a new standard under the RLUIPA.9 The court
explained that because the RLUIPA expands the definition of
"religious exercise to encompass any exercise of religion,"91 the
RLUIPA's protection is broader than its RFRA predecessor, and
thus the "central tenet" requirement does not apply. 92 At the
same time, however, the court recognized that the word
"substantial" must still retain some meaning. 93 Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit held that under the RLUIPA, a "substantial
burden" exists when government actions render "religious
exercise ... effectively impracticable." 94
C. The Ninth Circuit
In San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill,95 the
Ninth Circuit explained that its interpretation of "substantial
burden" under the RLUIPA was "entirely consistent" with the
Seventh Circuit's "effectively impracticable" standard. 96
Although the Ninth Circuit analogized its standard to the
Seventh Circuit standard, it set out its own version in slightly
different terms. As the Seventh Circuit did, the Ninth Circuit
first found that "religious exercise" under the RLUIPA was
rather easily satisfied due to the Act's broad statutory
definition. 97  In contrast to the Seventh Circuit's approach,
however, the Ninth Circuit went on to explain that because the
RLUIPA did not define "substantial burden," it would consult the
90 See id. at 761.
91 Id. at 760 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92 See id. at 761.
93 See id. ("Application of the substantial burden provision to a regulation
inhibiting or constraining any religious exercise.., would render meaningless the
word 'substantial,' because the slightest obstacle to religious exercise ... could then
constitute a burden sufficient to trigger [the] RLUIPAD .... ").
94 Id.
95 360 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff in San Jose Christian College was
a religious educational institution that brought suit under the RLUIPA against the
defendant municipality for denying its rezoning application. Id. at 1027. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant and the Ninth Circuit
subsequently affirmed. See id. at 1035-36. The Ninth Circuit explained that the
municipality's zoning application process did not create a substantial burden under
the RLUIPA and that the plaintiff seemed to be "simply adverse to complying with
the [application process] requirements." Id. at 1035. The court explained further
that the municipality placed no restriction on religious exercise and should the
plaintiff submit a complete application, it would not likely be denied. See id.
96 See id.
97 See id. at 1034.
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dictionary to help it determine the "plain meaning" of the term.98
After combining the two sources-the statutory-supplied
definition of "religious exercise" and the dictionary supplied plain
meaning of "substantial burden"-the Ninth Circuit concluded
that a "substantial burden" exists under the RLUIPA when the
government imposes a "significantly great restriction or onus on
any exercise of religion."99
D. The Eleventh Circuit
In Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside,100 the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit's "effectively
impracticable" standard, criticized it for being too harsh, and
created its own more relaxed definition for "substantial burden"
under the RLUIPA. 101 Because the RLUIPA does not define the
term, the Eleventh Circuit sought to "give the term its ordinary
or natural meaning."'10 2 Instead of following the Ninth Circuit's
dictionary method, the Eleventh Circuit found guidance by
looking to the Supreme Court's Free Exercise cases that used the
term "substantial burden."10 3  After combining the import of
articulations from those cases, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that under the RLUIPA, "a substantial burden can result from
pressure that tends to force adherents to forego religious precepts
or from pressure that mandates religious conduct." 10 4
E. The Fifth Circuit
Finally, in the Adkins case, the Fifth Circuit contributed its
formulation of "substantial burden" to the growing list of
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1034-35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
100 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004). The plaintiffs in Midrash Sephardi were two
Florida synagogues that challenged the validity of the defendant municipality's
zoning ordinances under the RLUIPA. Id. at 1218-19. The plaintiffs argued that the
municipality's zoning regulations that required them to relocate their synagogues,
constituted a substantial burden because the regulations would "require their
congregants to walk farther," causing congregants to cease attending services and
consequently impairing their synagogues' operation. Id. at 1227. The Eleventh
Circuit agreed that walking farther might be burdensome, but because it was only a
matter of a few extra blocks, the burden was not substantial under the RLUIPA. See
id. at 1228.
101 See id. at 1227.
102 See id. at 1226.
103 See id. at 1226-27.
104 Id. at 1227.
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definitions. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the various definitions of
substantial burden employed by other circuits under the
RLUIPA, as outlined above, but declined to adopt any of them.10 5
In creating its own definition, the Fifth Circuit explained that it
took into account "the plain wording of the statute, its legislative
history, the decisions of other circuits, and the Supreme Court's
pronouncements on the meaning of 'substantial burden' in other
contexts .... -106 The Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded that a
government action rises to the level of a substantial burden on
religious exercise under the RLUIPA if it "truly pressures the
adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and
significantly violate his religious beliefs. ' 107 However, the court
did not stop there. The Fifth Circuit went on to create an
exception to the rule: "[A] government action ... does not rise to
the level of a substantial burden on religious exercise if it merely
prevents the adherent from either enjoying some benefit that is
not otherwise generally available or acting in a way that is not
otherwise generally allowed."108 Significantly, it seems that the
Adkins case fell under this exception. 109 What is more important,
though, is that no other circuit has ever recognized an even
remotely similar exception under the RLUIPA. 110
III. THE RLUIPA SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN AND
THE PROPER STANDARD
The above review of the circumstances leading to enactment
of the RLUIPA as well as the examination of the various circuit
court definitions for "substantial burden" under the Act provide
an outline of the issues implicated by the Adkins case.1 ' It is
now necessary to identify the accurate articulation of
"substantial burden" under the RLUIPA.
A. Finding the Flaws
The definitions of "substantial burden" under the RLUIPA
105 See Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 568-69 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125
S. Ct. 2549 (2005).
106 Id. at 569.
107 Id. at 570.
108 Id.
109 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
110 See supra text accompanying notes 85-103.
111 See supra text accompanying notes 46-77, 85-109.
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used by the Eighth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits are flawed, and
the Fifth Circuit's exception completely contradicts the language
of the statute. The Eighth Circuit's approach can be easily
discounted by simply comparing the text of the RFRA to the text
of the RLUIPA. The definitional change in "exercise of religion"
from the RFRA to the RLUIPA is instructive. The RFRA
originally defined "exercise of religion" as "the exercise of religion
under the First Amendment to the Constitution."11 2 Under the
First Amendment, the exercise of religion encompassed only
those practices that were considered "central tenets" of the
adherent's religion.1 3 Although the RLUIPA adopted a great
deal from the RFRA, it did not carry over the same definition of
"exercise of religion." The RLUIPA abandoned the RFRA's term
"exercise of religion,"'1 4 and renamed it "religious exercise."115
Moreover, the RLUIPA further departed from its predecessor by
defining "religious exercise" as "any exercise of religion, whether
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief."'1 6
Thus, it seems clear that in ratifying the RLUIPA, Congress
unequivocally intended to remove the "central tenet"
requirement that previously existed under the RFRA and the
First Amendment. In addition, the other circuits all appear to
agree that the RLUIPA does not require that the burdened
activity be central to the adherent's religion." 7 Therefore, the
Eighth Circuit's definition of "substantial burden" is wrong and
the RLUIPA cannot be applied under the same standard as was
the RFRA.
Similarly, the standard used by the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits can be discarded by reviewing the text of the RLUIPA.
The test adopted by the Seventh Circuit and accepted by the
Ninth Circuit requiring religious exercise to be rendered
"effectively impracticable" decreases the protection of the
RLUIPA far beyond the protection those circuits afforded
religious adherents under the RFRA; the Seventh Circuit's
RLUIPA definition of "effectively impracticable" is distinctly
stronger than its RFRA definition of "significantly inhibit or
112 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
113 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
114 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (1993) (amended 2000).
115 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000).
116 Id. (emphasis added).
117 See supra text accompanying notes 85-103.
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constrain."118 This stricter "effectively impracticable" standard
directly contradicts the text of the statute, which states that the
RLUIPA "shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of
religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms
of this [Act] and the Constitution."'1 19 Because the "effectively
impracticable" standard does not afford broad protection of
religious exercise but instead actually diminishes it, the Seventh
and Ninth Circuit standards must also be rejected.
The text of the RLUIPA further supports the elimination of
the exception created by the Fifth Circuit.1 20 The Fifth Circuit's
exception provides that a substantial burden will not exist if the
government action "merely prevents the adherent from either
enjoying some benefit that is not otherwise generally available or
acting in a way that is not otherwise generally allowed."12'
Stating the exception in another way, the government may
impose a substantial burden if it results from a generally
applicable rule. 122 The RLUIPA, however, explicitly states that
"[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden.., even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability. . . "123 It
appears that the Fifth Circuit's exception completely contradicts
the express terms of the RLUIPA and, accordingly, it too must be
abandoned.
B. Gathering the Evidence
The preceding discussion has led to several conclusions.
Briefly summarized, the RFRA and, subsequently, the RLUIPA
were legislative reactions to Supreme Court decisions. 124 After
those decisions, Congress explicitly sought to expand the
protection of religious liberty.125 The RFRA first removed the
general applicability requirement in response to Smith.126 The
RLUIPA followed suit by reinstating the removal of the general
11s See supra text accompanying notes 89-98.
119 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-3(g) (2000).
120 See supra text accompanying note 38.
121 See Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 2549 (2005).
122 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Adkins v. Kasper, 125 S. Ct. 2549
(2005) (No. 04-1347).
123 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a) (2000).
124 See supra text accompanying notes 53, 63-65.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 54, 118.
126 See id.
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applicability requirement but also went further by removing the
central tenet requirement as it existed under the RFRA and the
First Amendment. 127  Finally, portions of the different
approaches taken by the Eighth, Seventh, Ninth, and Fifth
Circuits are flawed. 128
It appears that each circuit's definition of substantial burden
can be dismantled into two prongs that, when met, trigger the
protections of the RLUIPA. One prong identifies the
impermissible degree of burden while the other identifies the
scope of religious activity that cannot be burdened. After
reviewing the statutory language, the second prong is clearly
satisfied by "any exercise of religion."129 This leaves the first
prong: the language used to articulate the impermissible degree
of burden. Among the several first prong definitions discussed
above, this Comment has discarded all but three: (1) the Eighth
Circuit definition-"significantly inhibit or constrain"; 130 (2) the
Fifth Circuit definition-conduct that "truly pressures the
adherent to significantly modify ... and ... violate";13' and (3)
the Eleventh Circuit definition-"pressure that tends to force
adherents to forgo ... ."132 Although a simple review of the
statutory language has helped significantly narrow the
conflicting definitions, the fact remains that neither the RFRA
nor the RLUIPA defined the term "substantial burden."133 For
that reason, the analysis must proceed beyond the text of the
statute to find the meaning of the term.
C. Moving Beyond the Text
The ultimate goal in constructing a definition for
"substantial burden" under the RLUIPA is to create a standard
that accords with Congressional intent.134 When a statute is
127 See supra text accompanying notes 68-69, 114-15.
128 See supra text accompanying notes 110-23.
129 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
130 Murphy v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 1997)).
131 Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
2549 (2005).
132 Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir.
2004).
133 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000); 42 U.S.C §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5
(2000).
134 See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940). "In the
interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe
2006] 1353
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
clear on its face, the plain meaning of the words should control. 135
Although the term "substantial burden" is not ambiguous, it is
rather vague. In order to give the term more meaning, the Ninth
Circuit looked to the dictionary, but its efforts were futile because
they produced only more vague words. 136 The plain meaning,
therefore, seems to be anything but clear, especially considering
the varying and conflicting definitions employed by the circuit
courts.137 If the plain meaning of a term in a statute is unclear, it
is permissible to consult legislative history for guidance.' 38 As
the Fifth Circuit pointed out, the legislative history of the
RLUIPA indicates that "'[[s]ubstantial burden] as used in the
Act should be interpreted by reference to Supreme Court
jurisprudence.' "139 The term "substantial burden" has indeed
been used by the Court in its Free Exercise cases. 140 In logical
progression, the next analytical step will pursue a comparison
between the Supreme Court's Free Exercise cases and the
remaining circuit court definitions that this Comment has yet to
reject.
Although the Supreme Court has never created a bright-line
test to determine what constitutes a "substantial burden" in
every case, five cases provide useful guidance. These cases can
be broken down into two groups. The first group consists of cases
where the Court held that a substantial burden did exist. In
Sherbert v. Verner,141 the Court held that a substantial burden
the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress." Id.
135 See Cent. Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters., 454 U.S.
354, 359-60 (1982) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917))
("It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought
in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain... the sole function
of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.").
136 See San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034-35
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that substantial burden results from a "'significantly great'
restriction or onus on 'any exercise of religion' ") (citation omitted).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 85-109.
138 The words of the Supreme Court lend support to this approach:
When [a statute's plain] meaning has led to absurd or futile results,
however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the
act .... When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the
statute, is available, there certainly can be no "rule of law" which forbids its
use, however clear the words may appear on "superficial examination."
Am. TruckingAss'ns, 310 U.S. at 543-44.
139 Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 569 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
2549 (2005) (quoting Legislative Hearings, supra note 6, at S7776).
140 See infra text accompanying notes 143-51.
141 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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exists when an individual is required to "choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on
the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion.., on the other hand."142 In Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Commission of Florida,143 the Court reaffirmed its
finding in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment
Security Division,144 that a substantial burden exists when the
government puts "substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
his behavior and to violate his beliefs.' 45
The second group consists of cases where the Court held that
a substantial burden did not exist. In Bowen v. Roy,' 46 the Court
found that there was "no substantial burden where government
action interfered with, but did not coerce, an individual's
religious beliefs."'147  Finally, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n,148 the Court held that a substantial
burden did not exist where the government action did not create
a "tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their
religious beliefs.' 49
Comparing those cases to the definitions created by the
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits provides no apparent basis
on which to discount their standards. The Eighth Circuit
definition--"significantly inhibit or constrain"; 50  the Fifth
Circuit definition-conduct that "truly pressures the adherent to
significantly modify ... and. . . violate";151 and the Eleventh
Circuit definition-"pressure that tends to force ... to forego,"' 52
all appear to accord with the above accounting of the Supreme
Court's "substantial burden" holdings. 153 Thus, applying any of
142 Id. at 404.
143 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
144 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
145 Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141 (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718).
146 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
147 Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir.
2004) (interpreting Bowen, 476 U.S. at 707-08).
148 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
149 Id. at 450.
150 Murphy v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 1997)).
151 Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
2549 (2005).
152 Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1227.
153 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits both surveyed at least some of the Supreme
Court's Free Exercise cases before creating their own definitions. See id. at 1226-27;
Adkins, 393 F.3d at 569-70. In addition, the Free Exercise cases that this Comment
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these definitions to the Adkins case should produce the same
correct result that the Fifth Circuit should have reached.
D. Establishing the Right Standard
After analyzing the history and text of the RLUIPA and
reviewing the circuit court approaches along with Supreme Court
Free Exercise cases, the discussion must turn to articulating a
definition for "substantial burden" that remains consistent with
congressional intent. As previously noted, under the RLUIPA,
the term "substantial burden" consists of two prongs. This
Comment has narrowed the first prong to three circuit court
definitions that seem to be essentially identical and also appear
to be equally valid.154 Under the second prong, however, this
Comment has identified only one valid definition, as it is clearly
prescribed by the text of the RLUIPA. 155 Combining the analysis
of both prongs, therefore, produces three equally valid
definitions. This Comment concludes that a "substantial burden"
results under the RLUIPA when the government action
(1) significantly inhibits or constrains any exercise of religion, 156
(2) truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify and
violate any exercise of religion, 157 or (3) creates pressure that
tends to force the adherent to forgo any exercise of religion. 158
Thus, the application of each of these definitions to the facts of
the Adkins case should produce the same correct result.
IV. THE RLUIPA SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN AND
THE ADKINS CASE
Before applying the three standards to the Adkins case, the
reviewed also lend support to the rejection of the Seventh and Ninth Circuit
standard. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18. The "effectively impracticable"
standard employed by Seventh and Ninth Circuits erects an almost insurmountable
barrier and, therefore, simply cannot be reconciled with the attainable standards
that are found in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise cases. Compare supra notes 89-
98 and accompanying text, with supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
154 See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
155 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000) ("The term 'religious exercise' includes
any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief.").
156 Murphy v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 1997)).
157 Adkins, 393 F.3d at 570.
158 Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir.
2004).
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RLUIPA can be broken down into three manageable elements.
The RLUIPA provides:
[1] No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution... [2] even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, [3] unless the government demonstrates
that imposition of the burden on that person-(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling state interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.159
The discussion thus far has focused on the first two elements of
the RLUIPA. This is because, although not completely clear from
its opinion, the Adkins court found that the plaintiffs RLUIPA
claim failed on some combination of those two elements and,
therefore, never reached the third element. 160 The culmination of
the preceding discussion, however, reveals that the Fifth Circuit
erred in not finding the first two elements satisfied. This
Comment, therefore, will analyze the third element-as the
Adkins court should have-to determine whether there was in
fact a violation of the plaintiffs rights under the RLUIPA.
The plaintiff in Adkins contended that his "inability to
assemble on every Sabbath and every YEA holy day
'substantially burden[ed]' the practice of his religion ....
This burden, he claimed, resulted from the TDCJ religious
accommodation policy, which generally applied to all inmates
incarcerated by the State of Texas. 162 Keeping the previous
discussion in mind, the inquiry under the RLUIPA's first element
will turn on the answer to three questions. Does the prison
policy (1) significantly inhibit or constrain any exercise of
religion; (2) truly pressure the adherent to significantly modify
and violate any exercise of religion; and (3) create pressure that
tends to force the adherent to forgo any exercise of religion? 163
All three questions must be answered in the affirmative.
Assembling on the Sabbath and on holy days easily qualifies as
an exercise of religion.164 Moreover, it cannot be said that this
159 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a) (2000).
160 See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
161 Adkins, 393 F.3d at 566.
162 See id. at 566.
163 See supra text accompanying notes 155-57.
164 Even the Fifth Circuit, before rejecting the plaintiffs RLUIPA claim,
acknowledged that the YEA required gatherings for Sabbaths and holy days easily
2006] 1357
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
religious exercise is not inhibited, modified, violated, or foregone;
indeed, preventing assembly on even one day should suffice to
meet each standard. Finally, congregation on the Sabbath and
on holy days is a requirement of the plaintiffs faith and,
therefore, preventing assembly on any of these days must be
significant to the adherent. 165 Affirmatively answering each of
the three questions proves that the first element of the RLUIPA
was satisfied in the Adkins case and that a substantial burden on
the plaintiffs exercise of religion did exist.
The second element of the RLUIPA represents the point
where the Fifth Circuit committed its greatest error. 166 The
Adkins court explained that "a government action.., does not
rise to the level of a substantial burden on religious exercise if it
merely prevents the adherent from either enjoying some benefit
that is not otherwise generally available or acting in a way that
is not otherwise generally allowed."167 As pointed out above, this
exception completely contradicts the text of the RLUIPA, and
specifically the second element.168 The preceding analysis
already established that under the first element, the prison
policy imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs religious
exercise.1 69  Furthermore, the second element is also met
because, as explicitly stated, the RLUIPA is violated "even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability."'' 70 This
assessment thus supports two conclusions: First, although the
TDCJ religious accommodation policy is a rule of general
applicability, the RLUIPA remains violated; and second, the
Fifth Circuit's exception was unquestionably wrong.
Although, as noted, the Adkins court's errors allowed it to
reject the plaintiffs RLUIPA claim on the bases of the first two
elements, 71 this Comment now proceeds to the third element, as
qualify as religious exercise under the Act. See Adkins, 393 F.3d at 567-68.
165 Id. at 562 ("[T]he YEA requires its adherents to meet together on every
Sabbath and to congregate and make particular observations on specific holy days.")
(emphasis added); see also Fundamentals of Faith of Yahweh's Evangelical
Assembly, http://members.cox.net/thomasahobbs/yea_8.htm (last visited Sept. 15,
2006) (listing the fundamental requirements of the YEA faith).
166 See supra text accompanying note 158.
167 Adkins, 393 F.3d at 570.
168 See supra text accompanying notes 119-23.
169 See supra text accompanying notes 160-65.
170 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2000); see also supra text accompanying note 158.
171 See supra text accompanying note 159.
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an error-free Adkins court would have. 172 Under the RLUIPA,
the plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the
government action imposed a substantial burden on his religious
exercise. 173 Once the plaintiff has made a sufficient showing, the
burden shifts to the government to satisfy the third element:
The substantial burden on religious exercise may only be
justified if imposed on the adherent in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest through the least restrictive
means.
174
That leaves two final inquiries before determining whether
the Adkins court's errors amounted to a violation of the plaintiffs
rights under the RLUIPA: Could the government have
demonstrated that imposition of the religious accommodation
policy was in furtherance of a compelling state interest and, if so,
did it further that interest through the least restrictive means? 175
The government's strongest argument would likely be that the
TDCJ policy sought to promote safety and security in its prisons.
Under normal circumstances this might be a sufficiently
compelling interest to sustain the policy; however, Muslims in
the same facility were exempt from following the same rule. 176
Could it be the case that prison officials compromised safety and
security in order to allow Muslims unaccompanied congregation?
Certainly not. Prison officials must have found some other way
to maintain safety and security while still allowing Muslims
unaccompanied congregation. For that reason, the exemption for
Muslims proves that the government could not have satisfied the
second inquiry. If Muslims were permitted to congregate without
following the TDCJ policy, it necessarily follows that less
restrictive means were available to achieve the government's
interest in maintaining safety and security in its prisons. 77
Thus, although the government might have a compelling interest
in maintaining safety and security, preventing unaccompanied
religious congregation could not be the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest. As a result, the government would not
172 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a); see also supra text accompanying note 158.
173 See Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 n.32 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 2549 (2005).
174 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a); supra text accompanying note 158.
175 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(i)-(2); Adkins, 393 F.3d at 567 n.32; supra text
accompanying note 158.
176 See Adkins, 393 F.3d at 566.
177 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2).
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have been able to meet its burden under the third element of the
RLUIPA. 178 The correct and ultimate conclusion, therefore, is
that the Fifth Circuit erred in Adkins; the Fifth Circuit should
have reversed the lower court because the plaintiffs rights were
violated under the RLUIPA.
CONCLUSION
After walking through the Adkins opinion, this Comment
exposed the defects in the Fifth Circuit's resolution of the case.
The plaintiff in Adkins proved that the government imposed a
substantial burden on his religious exercise. The Fifth Circuit
erred in creating the exception that a substantial burden does
not exist when it results from a rule of general applicability; the
exception is totally inconsistent with the history and text of the
RLUIPA. Finally, had the Fifth Circuit not made this mistake,
the government would not have been able to meet its burden
under the RLUIPA because less restrictive alternatives must
have been available. In the Adkins case, therefore, the plaintiffs
rights under the RLUIPA were indeed violated.
The controversy, however, runs deeper. The RLUIPA is
currently being applied inconsistently throughout the nation.
Moreover, the Eighth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits are all
applying flawed standards. Along with the Fifth Circuit, these
courts will likely continue to misapply the RLUIPA and continue
to violate prisoners' rights. Although the Supreme Court
declined to address the issue in its recent review of the RLUIPA,
it took a step in the right direction when it upheld the Act's
constitutionality. But it must go further. Considering the circuit
split, the flaws in the various analyses, and the erroneous
outcome reached by the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court's
failure to grant certiorari was, at the very least, an unfortunate
oversight that resulted in severe injustice for one ill-fated
plaintiff. Injustice for future plaintiffs, however, can and must
be avoided. The Supreme Court must accept a case in which it
can create a fair and uniform standard for "substantial burden"
that will put an end to the conflict among the circuits.
178 See id.; Adkins, 393 F.3d at 567 n.32; supra text accompanying note 158.
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